Update: 2 April 2026: We filed a motion to dismiss Michael Kernan from this case. Seems solid. We’ll see. Scroll to the bottom of this post to read the motion to disqualify in its entirety.

Update 3 January 2026: Apparently embarrassed by his conflicted position formerly representing my company Michael Kernan decided to sub in Paul Katrinak (California Bar #164057) to support his client’s shady desires. Katrinak accused me in oral arguments on 4 December 2025 of owning a hacienda in Mexico. Sounds nice, but untrue. What is true is that Raymond Paul Katrinak has a Trump-tier belly, which he adorns with an extra-long also, Trump-like necktie. Katrinak is best known for having his California Bar license pulled in October 2010, during which time he was not eligible to practice law in California due to discipline with actual suspension.

Katrinak, Ellis, Michael Kernan, and one other person attempted to push through a default in my case, because I didn’t respond to their suit within 30 days. I appeared in court pro se, meaning without an attorney and moved to set aside the default. Despite all the legal firepower and Ms. Ellis ongoing willingness to present unlawful behavior in open court as though it were something to be proud of, Katrinak, his girthy gunt+necktie emsamble, Kernan, etc did not prevail and the default was set aside. Below are the details. Back to the Mexican Hacienda for Urbina.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Civil Division

Central District, Spring Street Courthouse, Department 25

25STLC00561 December 10, 2025

SHARIKA ELLIS vs DIGITAL MARKETING ADVISORS, et

4:15 PM

al.

Judge: Honorable Karine Mkrtchyan Judicial Assistant: S. Gabb Courtroom Assistant: None CSR: None

ERM: None

Deputy Sheriff: None

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff(s): No Appearances

For Defendant(s): No Appearances

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Ruling on Submitted Matter

The Court, having taken the matter under submission on 12/04/2025 for Hearing on Motion to

Set Aside/Vacate Default (CCP 473.5) Entered Against Defendant Zachary Urbina on

03/20/2025, now rules as follows:

Defendant Zachary Urbina’s Motion to Set Aside Default is GRANTED.

The default entered against Defendant Zachary Urbina on March 20, 2025 is hereby VACATED

and SET ASIDE.

The Court schedules an Order to Show Cause Re: Proof of Service of the Summons and

Complaint for 02/23/2026 at 9:30 a.m. in Department 25 at the Spring Street Courthouse.

SERVICE:

[ ] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) NO

[ ] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) NO

[ ] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) NO

OPPOSITION: Filed on November 19, 2025 [ ] Late [ ] None

REPLY: None filed as of December 2, 2025 [ ] Late [X] None

ANALYSIS:

I. Background

On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff Sharika Ellis (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against

Minute Order Page 1 of 8SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Civil Division

Central District, Spring Street Courthouse, Department 25

25STLC00561 December 10, 2025

SHARIKA ELLIS vs DIGITAL MARKETING ADVISORS, et

4:15 PM

al.

Judge: Honorable Karine Mkrtchyan Judicial Assistant: S. Gabb Courtroom Assistant: None CSR: None

ERM: None

Deputy Sheriff: None

Defendants Digital Marketing Advisors (“Digital Marketing”) and Zachary Urbina aka Zachary

Elliot (“Urbina”) (“Defendants”) and Does 1-100, alleging Intentional Misappropriation of

Plaintiff’s Right to Publicity and Breach of Contract causes of action. (Compl., p. 1.) Plaintiff

seeks “general damages in the amount of no more than $35,000,” interest, and costs of suit.

(Compl., Prayer.)

On March 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed proof of service demonstrating Urbina was served by

substituted service on Wednesday, January 29, 2025 at “200 South Barrington Avenue # 491451,

Los Angeles, CA 90049” (the “Service Address”). (3/13/25 Proof of Service.)

On March 18, 2025, default was entered against Digital Marketing.

On March 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed proof of service demonstrating a registered process server

served Urbina by substituted service on Wednesday, January 29, 2025 at the Service Address.

(3/13/25 Proof of Service.)

On March 20, 2025, default was entered against Urbina.

On March 28, 2025, a Notice of Related Case was filed as to Case Number 24BHSC02563

(Digital Marketing Advisors, et al. v. Ellis).

On September 29, 2025, Does 1-100 were dismissed without prejudice.

On October 16, 2025, Urbina, proceeding pro se, filed the instant Motion to Set Aside Default

(the “Motion”).

On November 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Opposition and request for judicial notice.

No Reply has been filed.

II. Procedural Issues

As an initial matter, Urbina failed to file proof of service demonstrating Plaintiff was served in

any manner with the Motion and notice of hearing.

However, given the timely Opposition, the Court exercises its discretion to address the Motion

on the merits.

Minute Order Page 2 of 8SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Civil Division

Central District, Spring Street Courthouse, Department 25

25STLC00561 December 10, 2025

SHARIKA ELLIS vs DIGITAL MARKETING ADVISORS, et

4:15 PM

al.

Judge: Honorable Karine Mkrtchyan Judicial Assistant: S. Gabb Courtroom Assistant: None CSR: None

ERM: None

Deputy Sheriff: None

III. Judicial Notice Request

In conjunction with the Opposition, Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of 20

Complaints filed by Urbina in various actions. (Jud. Notice Request, pp. 1-3, Exhs. 1-20.)

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request pursuant to Evidence Code section 452.

IV. Legal Standard & Discussion

Urbina seeks relief under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473, subdivision (b) and 473.5 due to

Urbina’s surprise and lack of actual notice. (Motion, pp. 3-5.) Specifically, Urbina contends that

Urbina was never served with the lawsuit by either personal service or service to Urbina’s

company’s post office box – the latter of which was inappropriately used for service of the

summons and complaint – and Urbina lives in Mexico City. (Motion, Urbina Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.)

Accordingly, Urbina was surprised when he received news of this lawsuit, and he lacked actual

notice in time to the defend the action.

In Opposition, Plaintiff contends: (1) the Motion is untimely under Code of Civil Procedure

section 473, subdivision (b); (2) Urbina perjured himself in his declaration and thus all testimony

should be rejected; (3) Urbina fails to show excusable neglect justifying setting aside the default;

(4) Urbina is judicially and equitably estopped from arguing service was improper given that

Plaintiff lists the service address on 20 Complaints filed in the Los Angeles Small Claims Court

as Plaintiff’s address to contact; (5) Urbina fails to assert any meritorious defenses; and (6)

Urbina had actual notice of this lawsuit in time to defend. (Opp., pp. 5-14.) In support of the

Opposition, Plaintiff submits the judicially noticed 20 complaints discussed above and two

declarations demonstrating Urbina knew of the lawsuit prior to and after entry of default. (Opp.;

Opp. Jud. Notice Req.; Kernan Decl.; Katrinak Decl.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b)

The court has broad discretion to vacate the entry of default, default judgment, or a dismissal

where the moving party timely establishes a proper ground for relief. (Cruz v. Fagor America,

Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495.) Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b)

contains two distinct provisions for relief from default. The first provision is discretionary and

broad in scope, providing: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his

or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against

Minute Order Page 3 of 8SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Civil Division

Central District, Spring Street Courthouse, Department 25

25STLC00561 December 10, 2025

SHARIKA ELLIS vs DIGITAL MARKETING ADVISORS, et

4:15 PM

al.

Judge: Honorable Karine Mkrtchyan Judicial Assistant: S. Gabb Courtroom Assistant: None CSR: None

ERM: None

Deputy Sheriff: None

him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application

for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be

filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a

reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or

proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)

“ ‘Surprise’ referred to in the provision of this section is ‘some condition or situation in which a

party to cause is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own,

which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.’ ” (Credit Managers Assn. v. National

Independent Business Alliance (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1173, citation omitted.)

The general underlying purpose of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) is to

promote the determination of actions on their merits. (Even Zohar Const. & Remodeling, Inc. v.

Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 838-839.)

Here, Urbina seeks relief under the discretionary provision of Code of Civil Procedure section

473, subdivision (b).

However, Urbina seeks relief more than six months after the entry of default on March 20, 2025.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Thus, the Motion is untimely.

Further, Urbina failed to file and serve a copy of a proposed responsive pleading in conjunction

with the Motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)

Accordingly, Urbina is not entitled to relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473,

subdivision (b).

Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5

Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 provides, in pertinent part:

When service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the

action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or

she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for

leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable

time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment

against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default

or default judgment has been entered.

Minute Order Page 4 of 8SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Civil Division

Central District, Spring Street Courthouse, Department 25

25STLC00561 December 10, 2025

SHARIKA ELLIS vs DIGITAL MARKETING ADVISORS, et

4:15 PM

al.

Judge: Honorable Karine Mkrtchyan Judicial Assistant: S. Gabb Courtroom Assistant: None CSR: None

ERM: None

Deputy Sheriff: None

(Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subd. (a).)

The motion also “shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that the party’s lack

of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or

inexcusable neglect. The party shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion,

or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subd. (b).)

Here, the Court finds the Motion is timely as to the default. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subd. (a).)

Urbina filed the Motion within two years from entry of default (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subd.

(a)), and there is no proof of service of the written notice of default on Urbina filed with the

Court. Thus, the Motion is timely.

However, Urbina failed to file and serve a copy of a proposed responsive pleading in conjunction

with the Motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subd. (b).)

Further, the Motion is supported by a declaration that fails to state Urbina’s lack of actual notice

was not caused by inexcusable neglect or avoidance of service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subds.

(a), (b).)

Accordingly, Urbina is not entitled to relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5.

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d)

“The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in

its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may,

on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d), emphasis added.)

An order is considered “void on its face only when the invalidity is apparent from an inspection

of the judgment roll or court record without consideration of extrinsic evidence.” (Pittman v.

Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1021.) “There is no time limit to attack

a judgment void on its face.” (Ibid.) However, if “the invalidity is not apparent [by an inspection

of the judgment or the judgment roll], it may be set aside by motion, if such motion is filed

within a reasonable time, i. e., not longer than the time set forth in Code of Civil Procedure,

section 473.” (City of Los Angeles v. Morgan (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 726, 730.) Code of Civil

Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) contains no express time limit, and the California

Minute Order Page 5 of 8SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Civil Division

Central District, Spring Street Courthouse, Department 25

25STLC00561 December 10, 2025

SHARIKA ELLIS vs DIGITAL MARKETING ADVISORS, et

4:15 PM

al.

Judge: Honorable Karine Mkrtchyan Judicial Assistant: S. Gabb Courtroom Assistant: None CSR: None

ERM: None

Deputy Sheriff: None

Supreme Court recently abrogated the rule that Section 473, subdivision (d) is subject to the two-

year limit set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5. (California Capital Ins. Co. v.

Hoehn (2024) 17 Cal.5th 207, 225-226 [“We hold that a section 473(d) motion to vacate a

judgment that is void for lack of proper service is not subject to the judicially imposed two-year

limitation”].)

In the context of a default judgment, Code of Civil Procedure section 670 subdivision (a) defines

the “judgment roll” as the following papers, without being attached together: “[T]he summons,

with the affidavit or proof of service; the complaint; the request for entry of default with a

memorandum indorsed thereon that the default of the defendant in not answering was entered,

and a copy of the judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 670, subd. (a).)

“California is a jurisdiction where the original service of process, which confers jurisdiction,

must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void.” (Honda Motor Co. v.

Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048, overruled on other grounds.)

“When a defendant challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper

service of process ‘the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving,

inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.’ ” (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140

Cal.App.4th 403, 413; see also Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160.) However, a

proof of service containing a declaration from a registered process server invokes a rebuttable

presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated in the return. (Cal.

Evid. Code, § 647; seeAmerican Express Centurion Bank v. Zara(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383,

390.)

Here, the Court finds the Motion is timely. As the instant noticed Motion is before the Court and

addresses, in part, improper service of process, the Court exercises its discretion to address Code

of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d).

The Court finds the judgment roll reveals that the default is void on its face. The proof of service

filed on March 20, 2025, states Urbina was substitute served but fails to state whether the service

address was a business, home, or usual mailing address. Thus, the proof of service is invalid, and

Defendant is entitled to relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d).

Even assuming arguendo that the judgment roll did not contain any facial defects, the Court finds

Urbina has demonstrated Urbina is entitled to relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473,

subdivision (d).

Minute Order Page 6 of 8SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Civil Division

Central District, Spring Street Courthouse, Department 25

25STLC00561 December 10, 2025

SHARIKA ELLIS vs DIGITAL MARKETING ADVISORS, et

4:15 PM

al.

Judge: Honorable Karine Mkrtchyan Judicial Assistant: S. Gabb Courtroom Assistant: None CSR: None

ERM: None

Deputy Sheriff: None

Here, the challenged proof of service is attested to by a registered process server and, therefore,

is entitled to a presumption of truth in its contents. (3/20/25 Proof of Service.) The burden of

proof thus shifts to Urbina. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 647; seeAmerican Express Centurion Bank v.

Zara(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390.)

In support of the challenge to service of process, Urbina submits a declaration that states the

service address is a United States Postal Service post office box, which is an inappropriate

address for service of the summons and complaint. (Motion, Urbina Decl., ¶ 5.) Code of Civil

Procedure section 415.20, subdivision (b) states that, in lieu of personal service, a “summons

may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house,

usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States

Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a

person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other

than a United States Postal Service post office box…” (Code. Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b),

emphasis added.) The Court finds this evidence satisfies Urbina’s burden of proof.

Thus, the burden of proof shifts to Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff fails to present any evidence

demonstrating that the service address is not a United States Postal Service post office box or

that Urbina agreed to be served with the summons and complaint at a United States Postal

Service post office box. While Plaintiff submits evidence of complaints in various legal actions

to demonstrate the service address was the proper address, the Court finds this evidence is

irrelevant to demonstrating Plaintiff served Urbina at a proper address for service of process in

the instant matter. A party’s use of an address on a pleading is not a dispositive showing of a

proper address for service of summons and complaint purposes under the Code of Civil

Procedure. Plaintiff fails to provide legal authority demonstrating otherwise.

The constitutional and statutory requirements re summons exist for defendant’s protection and

therefore are subject to waiver by defendant, provided the waiver is knowing and voluntary. (See

D. H. Overmyer Co. Inc. of Ohio v. Frick Co. (1972) 405 US 174, 185-186).

Thus, Urbina is entitled to relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d).

V. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, The Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default Entered Against Defendant

Zachary Urbina on 03/20/2025 filed by Zachary Urbina on 10/16/2025 is Granted.

Minute Order Page 7 of 8SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Civil Division

Central District, Spring Street Courthouse, Department 25

25STLC00561 December 10, 2025

SHARIKA ELLIS vs DIGITAL MARKETING ADVISORS, et

4:15 PM

al.

Judge: Honorable Karine Mkrtchyan Judicial Assistant: S. Gabb Courtroom Assistant: None CSR: None

ERM: None

Deputy Sheriff: None

The Court orders the default entered on 03/20/2025 as to Zachary Urbina vacated.

Order to Show Cause Re: Failure to File Proof of Service of the Summons and Complaint is

scheduled for 02/23/2026 at 09:30 AM in Department 25 at Spring Street Courthouse.

Clerk hereby gives notice.

Certificate of Service is attached.

Minute Order Page 8 of 8

Additional note 4 July 2025: After reading the handful of fake reviews that Michael Kernan likely had his friends and family write on Google and AVVO, there was one honest review which seemed genuine, which also highlighted Kernan’s time wasting issues. I also experienced this and terminated Kernan’s legal services agreement.

Below are my State Bar of California report as well as my Google review about Michael Kernan, a sub-par attorney in California.

I encourage anyone else who has genuine ethical concerns about Michael Kernan to email me for an honest, fact-based discussion or to review our private emails from 2021, which demonstrate his lack of connections at Youtube: ze@shorethang.media

Recently, Michael Kernan, an attorney previously retained by my company, filed suit against my company, representing a client adverse to me. Doing so, Kernan breached his fiduciary duty.

Despite California guidelines stating that attorneys are prohibited in small claims court, a recent hearing at the Beverly Hills Courthouse on February 3rd, 2025 Michael Kernan attempted to improperly insert himself into a hearing for our case (24BHSC02563), despite admonishment from the clerk and bailiff. Kernan insisted he was Sharika Ellis’ attorney, the defendant in my case.

Kernan is known to me professionally, as he previously worked for my company Digital Marketing Advisors in 2021. This presents a galling conflict of interest. Kernan breached his fiduciary duty, by working with someone adverse to my company, after representing DMA, my company.

Michale Kernan behaved in the manner of a bad actor, filing on behalf of his client to avoid responsibility for multiple years worth of digital damage at the hands of Ellis. Also, he conveniently ignored my company’s mutual release with Ellis, which plainly includes an unknown claims waiver.

Digital Marketing Advisors my model management company, has been in business for more than six years. Many of the models we work with have collaborated harmoniously for many consecutive years. Sharika Ellis was unable to conduct herself professionally for more than three months and was dismissed, paid a nominal settlement fee, and we signed a mutual release.

Likewise, Kernan, opposing counsel on this case was retained as an attorney by me and my company in 2021. This presents a clear, undeniable conflict of interest.

This textbook example of breach of fiduciary duty and it’s impact to our case, shall be elucidated herein.

In 2021, California attorney Stephen Michael Kernan was referred to my company Digital Marketing Advisors via a trusted business transactional attorney regarding a matter of our social media content which had been maliciously reported for community guidelines and copyright violations by unknown persons. All social media platforms contain content reporting mechanisms designed to allow honest feedback from social media users over sensitive topics like violent content, copyright content, etc. Sometimes those reporting mechanisms are gamed or used maliciously by unscrupulous individuals to torment their perceived enemies.

The case Kernan was originally retained to support in 2021 is remarkably similar to the Ellis case.

A former  model was sued in September 2020 (case #24STCV04340) over malicious content reporting, and eventually settled in October 2022 in favor of DMA. Not surprisingly, this was also a dramatic case, filled with famous beauties, treacherous attorneys, and involved my company for multiple consecutive years.

I hired Kernan on October 19th, 2021 and signed his legal services agreement that same day.

Kernan sought to levy his experience as an authority on the topic of intellectual property and social media to advise DMA regarding several unknown antagonists who were maliciously abusing community guidelines and copyright reporting to harass and have terminated DMA social media properties, over the course of several years (We call this our “anonymous defendants” case #21STCV36274). Using the investigative powers of the court and effective detective work, the malicious content reporting

parties were discovered to be a mentally deranged German national, and a Canadian individual and a former DMA model.

Kernan and I signed a legal services agreement regarding this matter, Kernan was paid a retainer fee, and did adequately perform legal services prior to his termination. Later, after his termination, Kernan sought to perform additional legal services for a fee and was turned away.

I am seeking the return of all legal fees paid to Kernan during the course of 2021. Any additional repercussions the State Bar of California may levy is entirely at their discretion.

UPDATE 16 May 2025 – S. Michael Kernan (California Bar #181747) remains in the hot seat, and likes to call me a “fraudster.” I found this email exchange humorous, as seeing as how Kernan used a January 2025 against me in court, I am posting our email exchange from May 2025, below. Although Kernan did work for me in 2021, he clearly doesn’t appreciate how far the insult “fraudster” misses the mark. I am one of the more authentic people you’re likely to me. 

—

Your false accusations are little more than confessions, Mike.

 

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ZACHARY URBINA (in Pro Per)

200 S. Barrington Avenue #491451

Los Angeles, California 90049

Telephone: (310) 428-9832

Email: ze@shorethang.media

In Pro Per for Defendant,

ZACHARY URBINA, an individual

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

SHARIKA ELLIS, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

DIGITAL MARKETING ADVISORS, a

California business entity; ZACHARY

URBINA, a.k.a ZACHARY ELLIOT, an

individual; and DOES 1 through 100.

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 25STLC00561

(RELATED CASE NO.: 24BHSC02563)

DEFENDANT ZACHARY URBINA’S NOTICE

OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL; MEMORANDUM OF

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES;

DECLARATION OF ZACHARY URBINA; AND

[PROPOSED] COURT ORDER.

Hearing Date: May 27, 2026

Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.

Department: 25

Reservation ID (CRS): 438400101455

NOTICE OF HEARING

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Zachary Urbina (“Defendant”), hereby brings

this Second Amended Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel and his firm, and for all other

appropriate relief necessary to protect the integrity of these proceedings.

This Motion is made on the grounds that Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. S. Michael Kernan, Esq.

(CA State Bar No. 181747), and his firm, THE KERNAN LAW FIRM, along with any of its

attorneys (hereinafter, “Conflicted Counsel”), previously represented Mr. Urbina and Digital

Marketing Advisors (“DMA”) in matters substantially and directly related to the instant litigation,

giving rise to duties of loyalty and confidentiality that preclude Conflicted Counsel’s current

representation of interests directly adverse to a former client, in violation of California Rules of

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Professional Conduct, Rule 1.9, and controlling California authority. See People ex rel. Dept. of

Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135; Flatt v. Superior

Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275; Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698;

City & County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 839; Kirk v. First

American Title Ins. Co. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 776.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This is a renewed motion to disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel. On October 14, 2025, the

Court denied Defendant’s prior motion on procedural grounds because Defendant was then in

default. On December 10, 2025, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to set aside that default.

This Second Amended Motion is now brought with the benefit of newly organized documentary

evidence that was not submitted with the prior motion and that directly refutes the representations

made by Conflicted Counsel under oath in opposition. DMA v. K. Rowe, the “Rowe Case”)

and Case No. 21STCV36274 (the “DMA Anonymous Filing”); and (c) the submission of

contemporaneous documentary evidence — Exhibits A through E — that establishes the nature

and extent of Conflicted Counsel’s involvement and demonstrates that his sworn opposition

declaration is materially false.

2. Conflicted Counsel stated under penalty of perjury that he had never heard the name

“K. Rowe” or “Sharika Ellis” during his retention. The email evidence in Exhibits C, D, and

E — all bearing Conflicted Counsel’s own email address — proves otherwise. K. Rowe

(“KR”) is discussed extensively, and by name, throughout the strategy emails Conflicted Counsel

both sent and received. The perjurious nature of this declaration is itself grounds for heightened

scrutiny of Conflicted Counsel’s continued participation in these proceedings.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Attorney-Client Relationship in Case No. 21STCV36274 — Established by

Written Retainer

3. On October 19, 2021, The Kernan Law Firm (S. Michael Kernan) executed a formal

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written Retainer Agreement confirming that it was retained to represent Zachary Urbina and

Digital Marketing Advisors in connection with LASC Case No. 21STCV36274. (See Exhibit A –

Retainer Agreement, attached hereto and incorporated by reference.).

4. The Retainer Agreement expressly identifies “Zachary Urbina and Digital Marketing

Advisors” (collectively) as “Client,” describes the full scope of legal representation to be provided,

and sets out billing rates and trust account arrangements. It was signed by Zachary Urbina on

October 21, 2021, on his own behalf and on behalf of Digital Marketing Advisors, and

countersigned by S. Michael Kernan, Esq. This signed, written retainer constitutes an express

contract creating an attorney-client relationship as a matter of law. See Koo v. Rubio’s

Restaurants, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 719, 729.

5. Conflicted Counsel has himself conceded being retained by Mr. Urbina in Case No.

21STCV36274. The signed Retainer Agreement, now attached as Exhibit A, places that

concession on an irrefutable evidentiary foundation.

B. Conflicted Counsel’s Active Involvement in the K. Rowe Matter (Case No.

20STCV41733)

6. Digital Marketing Advisors v. K. Rowe) was an active Los Angeles Superior

Court action in which Defendant Urbina and DMA were litigating against K. Rowe (“KR”), a

former contractor model of DMA who had engaged in systematic abuse of social media platform

reporting and takedown mechanisms to suppress DMA’s online presence — including YouTube,

Instagram, Linktree, and Reddit. Matthew Heerde of Heerde Law was counsel of record in that

matter.

7. Although Conflicted Counsel was not listed as counsel of record in Case No.

20STCV41733, the Court’s prior ruling found that Defendant failed to produce evidence of

Kernan’s involvement in that case. The emails attached as Exhibits C, D, and E now provide that

evidence in the form of Conflicted Counsel’s own contemporaneous correspondence.

8. Exhibit E (Email chain: “intro call,” Oct. 27–28, 2021) establishes that on October

27, 2021 — the same week as the Retainer Agreement — Mr. Urbina introduced Conflicted

Counsel directly to Nicole Costen, co-counsel on the Rowe matter, writing: “I recently hired a

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new attorney to help bring our KR containment effort into focus. His name is Michael

Kernan.” Conflicted Counsel immediately replied, confirming a prior phone call with Ms. Costen

and requesting the TRO documents in the Rowe case: “if you can send me the TRO and the TRO

paperwork that would be great!” (Ex. E.) The following day, Conflicted Counsel followed up

again in writing, pressing for the TRO documents because “Zach is concerned about the new

attack.” (Ex. E.) Conflicted Counsel thereby embedded himself directly in the litigation strategy

for the Rowe matter.

 

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9. Exhibit D (Email chain: “Phone conference,” Oct. 29 – Nov. 2, 2021) confirms that

Matthew Heerde, then-counsel of record in the Rowe case, wrote directly to Conflicted Counsel

on October 29, 2021, CC’ing Mr. Urbina, and explicitly referencing “their Los Angeles Superior

Court action against K. Rowe” and the anonymous Instagram action. Heerde proposed a

multi-attorney conference to discuss litigation strategy and “other actions Zach can take outside of

court to protect his social media properties, which I think is part of your mandate already.” (Ex.

D, emphasis added.) Conflicted Counsel responded that same evening, advising Mr. Urbina: “You

need a win. We should do a new TRO.” Conflicted Counsel also requested the single most

important item of litigation strategy: “Can I get the 10 Biggest things she did that you can prove?

Also how you would prove them.” (Ex. D.) This is not the conduct of someone with no knowledge

of or involvement in the K. Rowe matter.

10. Exhibit C (Email chain: “Organized evidence – TRO,” Oct. 31, 2021) shows

Conflicted Counsel directly coaching Mr. Urbina on how to build an evidentiary case for the TRO.

Mr. Urbina emailed Ms. Costen — CC’ing Conflicted Counsel — ten numbered instances of

evidence targeting K. Rowe, describing each item in detail. Conflicted Counsel responded

with substantive legal guidance on evidentiary standards, advising Mr. Urbina that suppositional

reasoning would not satisfy a judge and educating him on the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.

Conflicted Counsel then directed the evidentiary gathering effort by asking that the list be

expanded: “If you’re going to make it more circumstantial, we may need more than 10. Let’s try to

do 15.” (Ex. C.) This is substantive legal strategy advice regarding confidential evidence to be

submitted in an active TRO proceeding against K. Rowe.

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11. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully submits that Exhibits C, D, and E conclusively

establish Conflicted Counsel’s active involvement in the Rowe case litigation strategy and TRO

proceedings — including receipt of the client’s confidential litigation strategy, evidentiary

analysis, and internal risk assessment — notwithstanding his lack of formal counsel-of-record

designation.

C. Conflicted Counsel’s Sworn Declaration Is Materially False

12. In opposition to Defendant’s prior motion to disqualify, Conflicted Counsel

submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury in which he stated that he had “never heard the

name ‘Sharika Ellis’ or ‘K. Rowe’ from Defendant during the 6 days that he worked with the

Defendant.” (Opp., Kernan Decl., ¶¶ 3–6.).

13. K. Rowe is discussed extensively: her litigation conduct, her falsified RFA

responses, her abuse of platform reporting tools, her role in causing damage to DMA’s YouTube

and Instagram channels, and the TRO strategy being developed against her. Conflicted Counsel

authored, received, and responded to multiple emails in which K. Rowe is the central

subject.

14. Furthermore, Exhibit D shows that Matthew Heerde explicitly used the phrase “their

Los Angeles Superior Court action against K. Rowe” in a direct email to Conflicted Counsel.

It is not possible that Conflicted Counsel — a licensed attorney — read this email and remained

unaware of the name “K. Rowe.” His sworn declaration to the contrary is false.

15. While the Court’s disqualification analysis is independent of Conflicted Counsel’s

veracity, the Court should be aware that the sworn declaration filed in opposition to the prior

motion — and which influenced the Court’s prior ruling — was materially inaccurate as to a core

fact, specifically whether Kernan had ever been exposed to confidential information about

K. Rowe and the malicious takedown conduct that is at the heart of both prior and current

litigation.

16. D. The Confidential Information Shared with Conflicted Counsel

Moving party shared the following, but not limited to, confidential information

with conflicted counsel:

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– Platform escalation strategy, including DMA’s approach to obtaining records from

and escalating with YouTube and other social media platforms;

– Internal operations and decision-making related to DMA’s digital footprint,

including how the business managed and responded to platform reporting and

takedown events;

– Vendor and platform communications and relationships, including confidential data

obtained from YouTube and Instagram regarding malicious content reporting;

– TRO and injunctive relief strategy, including the specific evidence Defendant

intended to rely upon and the legal theory to be advanced;

– Settlement posture and risk assessment regarding the Rowe matter, including the

limited release previously reached with K. Rowe and its alleged breach;

– Information concerning contractor models, including the conduct of former DMA

contractors in filing DMCA takedowns and reporting content on DMA platforms;

and

– Information establishing that the foregoing conduct by K. Rowe was the same

category of conduct now attributed to Plaintiff Sharika Ellis — i.e., the same

“playbook” of contractor-model abuse of platform takedown tools to suppress

DMA’s digital business.

17. of the foregoing was shared with Conflicted Counsel in the context of the attorney-

client relationship established by the signed Retainer Agreement, and in the course of Conflicted

Counsel’s active participation in the joint TRO strategy as reflected in Exhibits C, D, and E.

E. The Ellis Case and the Rowe Case Involve the Same Conduct, Parties, and

Confidential Subject Matter

18. Defendant’s position is that the Ellis case involves the same category of conduct

Conflicted Counsel advised on in the Rowe matter: a former DMA contractor model exploiting

platform reporting and takedown mechanisms to suppress DMA’s digital business and interfere

with its commercial operations. Both K. Rowe and Sharika Ellis are former DMA

contractor models. Both disputes turn on the rights and obligations flowing from contractor

relationships with DMA. Both involve the same categories of sensitive DMA business

information — strategy, operations, vendor relationships, and contractor conduct — that

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Conflicted Counsel was exposed to during the prior representation.

19. This is precisely the “same playbook” that Defendant described in his prior

Declaration. The Court need not find that Ellis and Rowe committed identical acts. The

substantial relationship test requires only that the subject matter of the prior representation and

the current case be sufficiently similar that Conflicted Counsel is presumed to have received

confidential information material to the current dispute. That standard is clearly met here.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

20. Courts possess inherent authority to disqualify counsel to ensure the ethical

administration of justice. Code Civ. Proc. § 128(a)(5); SpeeDee Oil, 20 Cal.4th at 1145–1146.

Here, it is established by a signed written retainer. (Exhibit A.) Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp.

(2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1331–1332.

21. Once a substantial relationship is established, the presumption that Conflicted

Counsel received confidential information material to the current dispute is irrefutable for

purposes of the disqualification analysis. Jessen, 111 Cal.App.4th at 711–713. Proof that

Conflicted Counsel actually possesses or will use such confidential information is not required.

22. The duration of the prior representation is legally irrelevant to the substantial

relationship analysis. What matters is the nature of the access — not the number of days. Even

brief retentions can trigger disqualification where strategy and confidential information were

exchanged. Jessen, 111 Cal.App.4th at 713.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Mr. Urbina Has Standing as a Former Client.

23. As a former client of Conflicted Counsel concerning substantially related matters,

Mr. Urbina has standing to seek disqualification to protect his confidences and the integrity of

these proceedings. See Great Lakes Construction, Inc. v. Burman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1347,

1356–1357.

B. The Attorney-Client Relationship Is Established by Written Contract.

24. The signed Retainer Agreement (Exhibit A), executed by both Conflicted Counsel

and Zachary Urbina (on his own behalf and on behalf of Digital Marketing Advisors), constitutes

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an express written contract creating an attorney-client relationship as a matter of law. The Court

need not rely on Defendant’s declaration alone — the signed agreement speaks for itself.

25. As to Case No. 20STCV41733, Exhibits C, D, and E demonstrate that the formal

retainer relationship established for Case No. 21STCV36274 extended in practice to encompass

Conflicted Counsel’s active strategic advice in the Rowe litigation. While Conflicted Counsel was

not listed as counsel of record in the Rowe case, the contemporaneous email record establishes

that he was functioning as litigation advisor, actively shaping TRO strategy and evidentiary

development in that matter. Under the totality of the circumstances, this constitutes an implied

engagement with respect to the Rowe case as well. Koo, 109 Cal.App.4th at 732.

26. In prior opposition, Conflicted Counsel asserted the retention related to DMA’s

filing in LASC Case No. 21STCV36274 (later amended to include Alexander Wegescheidt) and

platform related guidance. Defendant contends that engagement was rooted in the same social-

media takedown crisis, including conduct previously litigated in DMA v. K. Rowe, LASC

Case No. 20STCV41733, and necessarily involved confidential strategy regarding platform

escalation, internal operations, vendor/platform communications, injunctive relief objectives, and

settlement posture. (Urbina Decl. 4-9.) Because those categories of confidences are material to the

issues and defenses here, the presumption of shared confidences controls, and disqualification is

required under Flatt/Jessen.

C. The Three Adams Factors are Satisfied.

27. Factor One — Factual Similarities. The prior representation involved: (a) a

former DMA contractor model; (b) alleged systematic abuse of social media platform reporting

and takedown tools; (c) resulting suppression of DMA’s digital business channels. The instant case

involves: (a) a former DMA contractor model (Ellis); (b) conduct Defendant characterizes as

misappropriation of digital rights and breach of contract, arising from the same contractor

relationship and DMA business operations; (c) the same categories of harm to DMA’s commercial

presence. The factual overlap is substantial and direct.

28. Factor Two — Similarities in Legal Issues. Both matters involve the rights and

duties flowing from DMA contractor-model relationships, including claims for breach of

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agreement and competing contentions regarding DMA’s business practices, strategies, and

contractor management. The same categories of trade secret and confidential business information

(customer/vendor lists, internal strategy, platform relationships) are at issue in both

29. Factor Three — Nature and Extent of Involvement. This factor is now

conclusively established by the documentary record. Exhibits C, D, and E show that Conflicted

Counsel:

– Was introduced to co-counsel as the attorney hired to “bring our K.

containment effort into focus” (Ex. E);

– Immediately requested and reviewed TRO filings and related litigation

documents in the Rowe matter (Ex. E);

– Was briefed by Heerde, counsel of record in the Rowe case, on confidential

litigation strategy, and described as having a “mandate” already in place to

protect DMA’s social media properties (Ex. D);

– Advised Mr. Urbina to seek a new TRO, articulating the legal strategy for doing

so (Ex. D);

– Directed Mr. Urbina to compile and expand his list of evidentiary submissions

for the TRO (Ex. D);

– Provided substantive legal guidance on evidentiary standards (the post hoc

fallacy discussion) and the specific type of concrete proof needed to sustain a

TRO (Ex. C); and

– Reviewed confidential evidence relating to K. Rowe’s alleged conduct,

including platform data described as “confidential” in the emails themselves

(Ex. C).

30. Conflicted Counsel was unquestionably “in a position to learn of the client’s policy

or strategy.” Adams, 86 Cal.App.4th at 1332. Indeed, the documentary record shows he not only

learned it but actively helped shape it. The third Adams factor is satisfied.

D. The Presumption of Shared Confidences Is Irrefutable and Controls.

31. Having established all three Adams factors, the Court must presume that Conflicted

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Counsel received confidential information material to the instant litigation. That presumption is

irrefutable for purposes of the disqualification analysis. Jessen, 111 Cal.App.4th at 711–713. The

analysis does not require proof that Conflicted Counsel will actually deploy that information

against Mr. Urbina — only that the risk exists by virtue of the substantial relationship.

32. The information Conflicted Counsel actually received — platform strategy, TRO

theory, evidentiary approach, contractor-model conduct analysis, settlement posture — is directly

relevant to the claims and defenses in the instant action, which involves the same business context,

the same type of contractor-model relationship, and the same categories of alleged misconduct.

E. Conflicted Counsel’s False Sworn Declaration Warrants No Deference.

33. In the prior opposition, Conflicted Counsel declared under penalty of perjury that he

had never heard the names “K. Rowe” or “Sharika Ellis” from Defendant. (Opp., Kernan

Decl.) The Court gave weight to this declaration in concluding that Defendant had not met his

burden. That was proper given the evidentiary record before the Court at the time. However, the

documentary record now before the Court — Exhibits C, D, and E, all authored in part by

Conflicted Counsel himself — demonstrates that this declaration was false

34. K. Rowe (“KR”) is the subject of dozens of references in Exhibits C and D

alone, in emails sent to and from Conflicted Counsel’s own email address. Exhibit D includes the

phrase “their Los Angeles Superior Court action against K. Rowe” in a direct email to

Conflicted Counsel. No inference or interpretation is required. Conflicted Counsel was aware of

and involved in the K. Rowe matter.

35. The Court’s disqualification analysis is independent of credibility determinations.

However, the false declaration removes any basis for the Court to credit Conflicted Counsel’s

characterization of the prior representation as limited or inconsequential.

F. Disqualification Protects the Integrity of the Proceedings.

36. SpeeDee Oil, 20 Cal.4th at 1146. Disqualification protects against litigation taint in

discovery and motion practice. Mr. Urbina never provided informed written consent permitting

Conflicted Counsel to represent an adverse party in a substantially related matter, and no such

consent is alleged by any party. (See Urbina Decl. ¶ 7.)

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V. REQUESTED RELIEF

Mr. Urbina respectfully requests that the Court enter an order that:

1. 2. 3. Disqualify Conflicted Counsel (and any attorney affiliated or associated with that

firm in connection with these matters) from representing Plaintiff in the instant case

and the related case;

Confirms that any prior or current determination regarding general appearance status

does not affect the Court’s authority to enforce former-client confidentiality and

disqualify Conflicted Counsel on ethical grounds; and

If the Court makes findings of attorney misconduct or imposes reportable sanctions,

directs the Clerk to transmit the Court’s order and any relevant minute orders to the

State Bar of California pursuant to Business & Professions Code § 6086.7.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant this Motion and enter the requested relief.

Dated: April 1, 2026 ZACHARY URBINA

_______________________________

Zachary Urbina, in Pro Per

Defendant

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DECLARATION OF ZACHARY URBINA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. I, Zachary Urbina, declare:

I am a named defendant in this action. I submit this declaration in support of my Motion to

Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel.

On October 14, 2025, the Court denied my prior motion to disqualify on procedural grounds

because I was then in default and therefore barred from taking affirmative steps. On

December 10, 2025, the Court granted my motion to set aside/vacate the default, and did in

fact vacate and set aside the default entered on March 20, 2025.

Mr. S. Michael Kernan, Esq. (CA State Bar No. 181747), and his firm, THE KERNAN

LAW FIRM, along with its attorneys (hereinafter “Conflicted Counsel”), represented me

and my company, Digital Marketing Advisors, from approximately October 19, 2021, until

November 2 2021, in connection with disputes involving contracted models, such as Ellis,

who breached their service agreements by filing frivolous DMCA takedowns interfering

with digital marketing practices administered by Urbina and his company.

In opposition to my prior disqualification motion, Conflicted Counsel stated he was hired to

support Digital Marketing Advisors’ anonymous defendant filing in Digital Marketing

Advisors v. PAULIE2397, et al., LASC Case No. 21STCV36274, which was later amended

to include Alexander Wegescheidt.

Kernan was retained in October 2021, before I understood Mr. Wegeescheidt’s relevance to

our company’s social media issues. Kernan was specifically retained to address the broader

social media “takedown” crisis affecting me and Digital Marketing Advisors—abuse of

community guidelines and platform takedown/reporting mechanisms to intentionally and

maliciously minimize our digital footprint.

This included issues connected to our earlier dispute and filing against a Canadian

defendant, K. Rowe, in LASC Case No. 20STCV41733, who was participating in the

same destructive behavior—abusing platform reporting/takedown tools to suppress our

online presence. In my view, this case involves the same playbook, and Kernan has

effectively switched sides.

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7. I never provided informed written consent allowing Kernan or his firm to represent a person

with interests adverse to mine in a substantially related dispute, and I am not aware of any

written consent signed by me that would permit such adverse representation.

8. Plaintiff in the instant case, Ellis, was a previous contractor service provider to me and

Digital Marketing Advisors.

9. The attached Exhibits A-E are true and accurate copies of documents in the possession of

both myself and opposing counsel.

10. In the course of that representation, I provided Conflicted Counsel with confidential

information and files concerning my personal and business strategies, finances, contracts,

client lists, credentials, and litigation risks. This confidential information included platform

escalation strategy (including YouTube-related approaches), internal operations and

decision-making related to our digital footprint, vendor and platform communications and

relationships, injunctive relief and TRO strategy, and settlement posture and risk

assessment. It also included information and materials concerning contractor models,

frivolous DMCA takedowns, copyright disputes, and related breaches of contract.

11. The issues in this lawsuit concern the issues that Conflicted Counsel was retained to

address, and substantially overlap with the subject matter of the prior representation.

12. After Digital Marketing Advisors, and I terminated the legal representation relationship

with Conflicted Counsel, he then elected to pursue legal actions against myself and my

businesses.

13. In the prior opposition, Conflicted Counsel suggested that I was satisfied with his work.

That is not true. Kernan was terminated for, among other reasons, misrepresenting his

relationship with YouTube and failing to obtain the temporary restraining order relief I

expected him to pursue against Ms. Rowe in LASC Case No. 20STCV41733 (the matter

later settled in our favor).

14. In the prior opposition, Conflicted Counsel stated or implied that the State Bar of California

provided a “pass” on his unethical behavior in the complaint I filed, State Bar Matter No.

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25-O-12454. That is not true. The matter is under further review and has been reopened

after a successful appeal.

15. I also request that the Court order appropriate relief the Court deems just due to the

conflicted conduct, including disgorgement of fees paid to conflicted counsel and such

additional sanctions as the Court sees fit. If required, I can provide invoices/payment

records establishing the amounts paid.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is

true and correct. Executed April 1, 2026, at Los Angeles, California.

______________________________________

Zachary Urbina

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ZACHARY URBINA (in Pro Per)

200 S. Barrington Avenue #491451

Los Angeles, California 90049

Telephone: (310) 428-9832

Email: ze@shorethang.media

In Pro Per for Defendant,

ZACHARY URBINA, an individual (Special Appearance Only)

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

SHARIKA ELLIS, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

DIGITAL MARKETING ADVISORS, a

California business entity; ZACHARY

URBINA, a.k.a ZACHARY ELLIOT, an

individual; and DOES 1 through 100.

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 25STLC00561

DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL

NOTICE

Hearing Date: May 27, 2026

Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.

Department: 25

Reservation ID (CRS): 438400101455

The Defendant Zachary Urbina (“Defendant”), respectfully requests that the Court take

judicial notice of the following records pursuant to California Evidence Code section 452,

subdivision (d) (records of any court of this state), and California Evidence Code section 453.

Each item listed below is a record of a court of this State and is therefore a proper subject

of judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452(d). Defendant requests that the Court take

judicial notice of these documents for the existence of the filings and rulings reflected therein, and

the fact that such filings and rulings were made in the referenced actions.

A. Matters to Be Judicially Noticed

1. Minute Order dated October 14, 2025, in this action, Ellis v. Digital Marketing Advisors, et

al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 25STLC00561, reflecting the Court’s ruling

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2. 3. 4. denying Defendant’s prior motion to disqualify on procedural grounds because Defendant

was then in default.

Minute Order dated December 10, 2025 in this action, Ellis v. Digital Marketing Advisors,

et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 25STLC00561, reflecting the Court’s ruling

granting Defendant’s motion to set aside/vacate default, vacating and setting aside the

default entered on March 20, 2025, and setting an OSC re proof of service and addressing

substituted service/service location issues under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20(b).

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify (filed September 30, 2025) in this

action, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 25STLC00561, to the extent relevant to the

procedural history of the prior motion and counsel’s statements regarding the scope of the

prior representation

Minute Order dated April 1, 2026, in this action, Ellis v. Digital Marketing Advisors, et al.,

Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 25STLC00561..

Dated: April 1, 2026 ZACHARY URBINA

_______________________________

Zachary Urbina, in Pro Per

Defendant

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ZACHARY URBINA (in Pro Per)

200 S. Barrington Avenue #491451

Los Angeles, California 90049

Telephone: (310) 428-9832

Email: ze@shorethang.media

In Pro Per for Defendant,

ZACHARY URBINA, an individual (Special Appearance Only)

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

SHARIKA ELLIS, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

DIGITAL MARKETING ADVISORS, a

California business; ZACHARY

URBINA, a.k.a ZACHARY ELLIOT, an

individual; and DOES 1 through 100.

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 25STLC00561

[PROPOSED] COURT ORDER

Hearing Date: May 27, 2026

Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.

Department: 25

Reservation ID (CRS): 438400101455

[PROPOSED] COURT ORDER

The Court, having read and considered Defendant Zachary Urbina’s Motion to Disqualify

Plaintiff’s Counsel; the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Declaration;

any opposition and reply; and having heard argument (or having taken the matter under

submission and determined that oral argument is unnecessary), FINDS AND ORDERS as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s current counsel of record, S. Michael Kernan, Esq. (State Bar No. 181747), and

The Kernan Law Firm, together with any attorney affiliated or associated with that firm in

connection with this matter, are hereby DISQUALIFIED from further representation of

Plaintiff in this action.

2. Plaintiff’s current counsel of record, S. Michael Kernan, Esq. (State Bar No. 181747), and

The Kernan Law Firm, together with any attorney affiliated or associated with that firm in

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3. 4. connection with this matter, are hereby DISQUALIFIED from further representation of

Plaintiff in the related case, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 24BHSC02563.

This ruling is issued on Defendant Urbina’s general appearance.

If, in connection with this Order, the Court makes findings of attorney misconduct or

imposes reportable sanctions, the Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this Order and

any relevant minute orders to the State Bar of California pursuant to Business & Professions

Code § 6086.7.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: ______________________

_______________________________________________

JUDGE/COMMISSIONER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

Department 25

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PROOF OF SERVICE

I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this action. [Ellis v. Digital Marketing Advisors;

Zachary Urbina; et al., Case No. 25STLC00561, Los Angeles County Superior Court, Dept.

25]. My business address is 333 S. Grand Ave, Ste 3310, Los Angeles, CA 90071.

On April 1, 2026, I served the following document(s): DEFENDANT ZACHARY

URBINA’S SPECIAL APPEARANCE NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO

DISQUALIFY PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND

AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF ZACHARY URBINA; REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL

NOTICE; and [PROPOSED] ORDER upon the following parties/persons:

Parties Served:

S. Michael Kernan, Esq.

THE KERNAN LAW FIRM, APC

9663 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 450

Beverly Hills, California 90210

Mkernan@kernanlaw.net

Method(s) of Service (check one or more):

[X] Electronic filing system (EFS) service. Pursuant to local rules and CRC

2.251(b)(1)(B), I caused the documents to be electronically served through the Court-

approved electronic filing service provider, which sent notification of filing/service to the

registered service addresses of the persons listed above:

Mkernan@kernanlaw.net

[X] U.S. Mail (CCP § 1013(a)). I placed the documents in a sealed envelope addressed to

the persons at the addresses listed above and deposited the envelope with the U.S. Postal

Service with postage fully prepaid. I am readily familiar with my practice for

correspondence mailing; it would be deposited on the same day in the ordinary course of

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business at:

S. Michael Kernan, Esq.

THE KERNAN LAW FIRM, APC

9663 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 450

Beverly Hills, California 90210

[ ] Personal Service (CCP § 1011). I delivered the documents to the office or usual place

of abode of the persons listed above by leaving the documents with a person apparently in

charge, or by personally delivering them to the person, between 8:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.

[ ] Fax (CRC 2.300 et seq.). Based on a written agreement to accept service by fax, I

transmitted the documents to the fax numbers listed above. No error was reported by the fax

machine.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the

foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on April 1, 2026, at Los Angeles, California

___________________________________

David Baldwin

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MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL

More shady characters: Thamsanqa “Michael” Mpofu